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Abstract 
The restive citizens of most Africa countries continue to demand free and fair elections as the only democratic 
tool that equates the fundamental human rights. Even in some post conflict countries, the general public have 
adopted elections as a means of demanding accountability, good governance and independent and impartial 
election management bodies. Whereas elections have become commonplace in Africa over the past decades, 
some recent elections have failed to legitimise power by creating tension and causing violence. Understanding 
the dynamics around electoral violence has become fundamental to limiting the risk of electoral violence to 
improve the quality of democracy in Africa. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to examine how EMBs and 
the judicial system can prevent electoral violence, followed by an assessment of the role stakeholders and 
effective electoral cycle management play in preventing election related disputes. The study uses uses the 
politico-legal debates to support the argument of causes of electoral violence on the African continent and ways 
to prevent them. The study suggests that an independent and impartial EMBs and judiciary are prerequisites for 
effective election dispute resolution mechanisms. The again concludes that the multi-stakeholder conflict 
management, which brings together various types of actors and supports social diversity, is fundamental to 
promoting peaceful electoral processes in Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, elections have become an important democratic imperative in almost all African states and 
are now a mandatory tool for accessing or retaining a political power. Recent global democratic trend reflects the 
view that, in Africa and beyond, citizens value elections.  Elections have contributed to the emergence of 
democratic governments in Ghana, Benin, Cape Verde, Senegal, and South Africa. Some Africa countries like 
Liberia and Sierra Leone that were engaged in civil war and protracted conflict have even come out to hold 
credible elections. There has been legitimate power alternation between incumbent governments and opposition 
parties in some African countries since the adoption of multi-party democracy. For example, Ghana’s 2016 and 
the Liberian 2018 presidential elections which were notably competitive, the ruling parties handed power over to 
the opposition parties, reaffirming the entrenchment of democracy in Africa. The universal acceptance of 
elections in Africa is as a result of the growing expectations of citizens to demand accountable governance.  
Indeed, democracy has seen growth in many African societies. According International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (2014), 29 out of the 54 countries on the Africa continent held elections in 2015.  However, 
the fact that electoral processes have now become commonplace does not imply political stability in Africa, 
particularly in countries that lack the necessary political and technical infrastructure to deal or prevent election-
related violence. In some cases, elections have been manipulated to legitimate autocratic regimes or to ensure 
dynastic successions on the continent (International Peace Institute, 2011). A study by Bekoe (2010) indicates 
that violence affects about 20 to 25 percent of elections in Africa. Elections in Africa have become periods of 
despair and anxiety for contesting candidates as well as the general citizenry whose efforts to seek new 
leadership for their respective countries often prove abortive (Vorobyev, 2010). Authoritarian regimes like Egypt, 
Togo, Zimbabwe and recently in Benin have been able to exploit the symbol of elections by abusing them 
through fraud and skewed procedures. Over the past decade, electoral processes have become triggers of 
violence in several African countries: The Democratic Republic of Congo (2006 and 2018), Togo (2005), 
Nigeria (2007), Lesotho (2007), Guinea-Bissau (2008), and Senegal (2012). In Kenya, flawed elections 
conducted in 2007 left a trail of disaster which manifested itself through ethnic clashes, leading to the death of 
over 1000 people. Likewise, the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe took violent dimension when political leaders 
anticipated defeat (Masunungure, 2009). Electoral violence that characterised these elections led to loss of many 
lives and human displacement. In each of these cases, election lost its democratic value and failed to confer 
legitimacy on the political authority. 
Tensions over land rights, employment and ethnic marginalization, religion and access to national resources 
and wealth are the dominant characteristics of recurring electoral violence (Bekoe, 2010). Such is the case in 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) DOI: 10.7176/PPAR 
Vol.9, No.7, 2019 
 
2 
Africa, where loss of electoral contest leads to the exclusion of the losers and their followers from accessing 
public resources. According to Masunnungure (2009), elections are periods where the political incumbent takes 
stock of achievement to assess whether they will survive the electoral contest through abuse of state resources. 
For the opposition, elections are period to prove during campaign that they have better proposals of solving the 
plight of the citizenry than the incumbent party. This is also the period for the opposition to endure political 
harassment, intimidation and exclusion from the use of state facility (Melber, 2002). Hammar (2008) posits that 
elections in Africa also presents opportunity for contesting candidates to feed the electorate with menu of lies, 
falsehood, confusion and misconceptions. During this time, the risk of instability is particularly high in fragile 
political regimes. Although elections tend to heighten tensions and engender violence, the intention is not to 
question their democratic value for citizens to select their political leaders.  
The question therefore is whether elections in Africa do not meet the standards and guiding principles of 
transparency, fairness and freeness in order to guarantee their acceptability from all stakeholder in order to 
promote peace. According to Calingaert (2006), the entire electoral process in many countries is susceptible to 
fraud.  This means that if African leaders mean well to embrace electoral democracy, they   must fight against 
practices that undermine democratic elections. Many areas of election administration in Africa require legal and 
administrative reforms to enable Africa benefit from electoral dividends. This article focuses on assessing the 
failings and strengths of electoral management bodies and election dispute resolution mechanism that contributes 
or militates against electoral governance in Africa. These issues are at the core of securing transparent, free and 
fair election. They are also essential ingredients to African countries that are committed to respecting, promoting, 
and protecting the fundamental right to vote.  Given the experience of electoral crises in some African countries 
like Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, and the threats they pose to democratic ambitions, it is important to 
explore available options for strengthening election institutions and mechanism for managing election related 
violence and the impact of such options and their prospects for future elections. It is the view of this article that 
electoral reforms in these areas could enable African states strike a successful balance between democratic 
participation and governance. 
 
2. Electoral Management 
Elections and their administration remain the most complicated, time-bound and action-packed activities 
undertaken by electoral institutions. At every stage of the electoral cycle, election management bodies (EMBs) 
should discharge their duties in a professional manner to allow citizens the opportunity to participate and make 
informed decisions about the leaders who will govern them. The quality and credibility of elections depend on 
the establishment of an effective, stable and legitimate administrative system. According to Duodu (2010), for a 
country to organize credible, free and fair elections, certain institutional framework should be put in place. This 
institutional structure provides fair avenue for citizens to freely to elect and be elected under rules and 
regulations that are clear to all contesting parties (Hammer, 2009). Some of the institutional and political 
architecture involve the establishment of independent electoral management bodies (EMBs) that seek to preside 
over free and fair electoral processes. Election management bodies are public institutions that play an important 
role in securing, protecting, and promoting democracy in any state. These bodies have become the cornerstones 
of the electoral process (OSIWA, 2011). The core activities of EMBs are (1) determining who is eligible to vote, 
(2) receiving and validating the nominations of the participating parties and candidates, (3) conducting the 
polling, (4) counting the votes, and (5) disseminating the results (Wall et al., 2006). By performing these 
activities, the EMB has to ensure that the elections are conducted and managed in a way that is efficient, 
transparent and fair. Failure to do so can trigger electoral violence as was the case in 2007 elections (Jacobs 
2011). 
Given the control that election management bodies have over the electoral process, they need to be 
independent and impartial to enhance citizen confidence in the electoral process. Election Management Bodies 
that are not widely viewed as impartial can fatally damage the credibility of the election. The quality and 
performance of election administrators have a strong impact on whether or not electoral violence occurs (UNDP, 
2009). Positive attributes such as inclusive membership structure, political balance and professionalism to these 
bodies, could contribute to the legitimacy of the election and, if absent, can trigger election-related violence 
(Sisk, 2008). There are different types of electoral management bodies and administration models in Africa. 
According to Lopez-Pintor (2000), elections can be administered by the government; by the government but 
under supervision of an independent authority; or by an independent commission.  
While administration of election may be fairly done by the government-based in advanced democracies, in 
a fragile economies and conflict prone divided countries with ethnic cleavages, government-based electoral 
administrations face legitimacy issues and accusations of manipulation by the incumbent (Pastor, 1999; Lopez-
Pintor 2000). The credibility of these EMBs therefore rests on their independence, representativeness and 
sustainability of the body, and professionalism and credibility of the members of the election body.  These were 
the appeasing factors taken into consideration in composing the Tunisia Independent High Authority for 
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Elections to manage the 2011 electoral process following the political turmoil. Preponderance of evidence in 
some African countries point to the fact that elections run by independent election management bodies are more 
successful with the outcome of the elections fully respected and uncontroverted. It is for this reason that Lopez-
Pintor (2000) points out that historical evidence as well as recent conclusions by observers, analysts and 
practitioners, almost unanimously indicates that elections run by independent electoral bodies are preferable to 
those run by executives.  
However, just like the electoral system, the electoral administration model is often not deliberately chosen 
but a product of the colonial inheritance (Jinadu, 1997; Wall et al., 2006). The role of Independent Electoral 
Management Bodies (EMBs) is very critical to the outcome of an election as these electoral bodies derive their 
powers and mandate from the national constitutions and laws of the various state (Makumbe, 2009).  However, 
in conflict prone and volatile societies, the decision of the election management body regarding the eligibility 
criteria for contesting candidates and voter registration is often characterized with mistrust and seen as partial to 
rival groups which has the tendency of endangering the entire electoral process. Studies have pointed to weak 
institutions and institutional rules governing the election process as one of the main contributing factors to post-
election violence (Khadiagala, 2009; Baregu 2009). Zeev and Russett (1993) posit that the frequency of political 
and electoral violence is closely related to the degree of performance by electoral institutions. This supports the 
assertation by Eklit and Reynold (2002) that, acceptability of election results is dependent of whether a particular 
state has created an autonomous and independent election management bodies with the responsibility of 
conducting elections professionally and impartially. Example of such election management bodies is the 
Electoral Commission of Ghana and Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa.  
The nature, intensity and consequent outcomes of electoral violence in African countries have taken 
different dimensions and forms. According to Sisk (2008), the risks associated with organizing elections 
becomes high, if the electoral process is not managed professionally and impartially by a trusted institution. The 
recent clashes in Mali, Togo, Democratic republic of Congo and Sudan are all reflective of the view that, the will 
of the people are not considered be the sacred outcome of political contest. It is worthy to posit that not only can 
the EMB create electoral tension by the way it organises the election, its own composition, and related behaviour 
of its members, can also become a focal source of electoral conflict. This means that electoral violence may 
emanate from deficiencies in the electoral process itself as much as it may be stimulated by underlying social, 
political and economic cleavages or tensions. 
In many African countries, the whole concept of election administration by these election management 
bodies is failing, from the primary activity of voters’ registration and conduct of credible elections to the judicial 
bodies in charge of electoral disputes. For elections to be successful, it is essential that the EMB ensures the 
integrity of the elections. This can significantly reduce the likelihood of election-related violence. Electoral 
malpractice undermines public confidence in the credibility of the elections and increases the risk of protests 
(Norris, 2012). Past experience has revealed that discredited election management bodies are incapable of 
managing a competitive electoral contest and often find themselves at the core of controversy (Kriger, 2011).  
In most countries, the election management body is a permanent, specialized agency. The EMB should take 
decisions independently, without being subjected to partisan influences. In most Africa countries like Ghana, 
South Africa and Nigeria, the electoral body has exclusive legal mandate to handle all aspect of the electoral 
process. For example, in Ghana, Article 45 of the 1992 Constitution create the Electoral Commission as the only 
single body mandated to manage every aspect of the electoral process. The fact that these election management 
bodies manage critical activities such as the right to vote which are of high interest to contesting candidates and 
parties, make it vulnerable to political interference. An electoral commission that is structurally independent 
from government and consists of neutral experts will generally be perceived as impartial because it has no 
political affiliation. Government-based models, especially in post-conflict states, may be suspected of working to 
the advantage of the incumbent (Wall et al. 2006). The authority and competence of the EMB are dependent on 
the technical ability of its members (Elklit and Reynolds 2002).  
To achieve institutional strength and autonomy to insulate the EMBs from control and direction by any 
external organs of the state, the constitution of various African countries such Kenya (Article 41 of the 2008 
Constitution), Ghana (Article 46 of the 1992 Constitution), Zimbabwe (Article 61 of the 1979 Constitution) has 
placed considerable emphasis on the independence of the Election Management Bodies. For example, in South 
Sudan, to qualify as a member of the National Elections Commission (NEC), which is responsible for the 
organization and management of the elections, a person should be of proven integrity, independent, competent, 
non-partisan and impartial (National Elections Act, 2012). One would expect that based on these constitutional 
guarantees, these electoral bodies and the individual commissioners would to be guided exclusively by the law in 
the discharge of their mandate.  
However, despite these constitutional protections, election bodies in some African countries are vulnerable 
to conduct credible elections due to the mode of appointment of the members of these Commissions. According 
to Lindberg (2008), the process of appointing members of the EMB goes to the heart of guaranteeing a free and 
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fair elections.  Several works on democracy in Africa and elsewhere have also underscored the importance of 
having a broad-based, as opposed to unilateral, appointing authority (Harris, 1999; Pottie, 2001; Gyima-Boadu, 
1998; Hasen, 2005; Emert et al, 2007).  Freeman (2006), reveals that the process of appointment of the members 
of election management bodies should inspire confidence in the public that the members will perform and 
discharge their mandate in accordance with the law. This means that the principle of unilateral appointment 
process by the government of the day has the proclivity of reducing the appearance of independence of the 
electoral body. Elkit, Jorgen and Reynolds (2002) affirms that staff recruitment has a significant impact on the 
quality of an election and credibility of the election management body. Accordingly, the possibility of partiality 
on the part of the election management body or an individual official of the body is likely to cast doubt on the 
entire electoral process. 
Abuya (2009) established the extent of severity and consequences of a flawed presidential election. 
Thompson and Kuntz (2005) posit that stolen presidential elections often trigger widespread outrage. It is 
therefore averred that the perceived fairness of an elections is based not only on how the election management 
body as an institution is perceived, but also on the extent to which individual commissioners are seen to be 
neutral (Southall and Fox, 1999). It is on this reason that the Commonwealth Expert Team in the Sri Lankan 
2005 Presidential Election, expressed concern about sitting presidents appointing members of the election 
management bodies especially if the president is also a candidate in the electoral contest. This was the case that 
resulted to chaos and electoral violence in both the 2007 election in Kenya and the 2008 election in Zimbabwe. 
A case in point is Uganda where prior to the 2011 general election, the president who was also the presidential 
candidate of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) appointed the members of the Electoral 
Commission of Uganda. The opposition became very critical and suspicious of all actions taken by the electoral 
commission, even the ones that could have led to reforming the electoral process in Uganda. This mistrust fueled 
political tension leading up to the 2011 election (EU Election Observation Mission Report, 2011).  
Experience show that the appointment of members of the election bodies by the president of a country is not 
in itself an unsurmountable problem. For example, in countries like the United Kingdom and Australia, members 
of the Electoral Commission are appointed by the Queen and Governor-General, respectively. The challenge of 
this mode of appointment in Africa, however, lies in whether these appointed members would be neutral to 
delivers elections in line with internationally acceptable standards and are in compliance with the legal and 
regulatory framework governing the elections. Studies in Botswana (Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie, 2005) and 
Lesotho (Tsikoane, 2007) suggests that an all-inclusive appointment process could minimize doubts over the 
impartiality of the election management body as well as contribute to the success and credibility of elections. 
Sofie and Wagner (2013) also suggest that the principles of descriptive representation can be adopted for the 
composition of election management bodies in conflict prone societies to enable the EMB prevent allegations of 
perceived partiality. Descriptive representation is where a member of an ethnic or minority group represent them 
in the EMB to build trust among people that the EMB will handle its politically sensitive mandate in an objective 
manner. 
Again, security of tenure of the members of election management bodies could impact of the professional 
performance of such institutions. Commission members must have the mandate to make independent decisions, 
and must have the space and means to do their work. In Kenya and Zimbabwe, the independence Commission 
was strengthened by the fact that its commissioners were given a constitutional tenure of five-years once 
appointed. However, in Ghana, the members of the Commission have life time security of tenure until they are 
retired from public service. The Chairman of the Commission retires at the age of seventy (70) years, the two 
Deputy Chairmen retires at the age of sixty-five (65) years and the four other members of the Commission also 
retire at the age of sixty (60) years. The long-term security of tenure may guarantee the independence of the 
EMBs. Frequent state intervention, influence and rotation of member of these Commission prevents election 
bodies from executing their function in the interest of the public. In this way, the absence of functional and 
administrative independence on the part of the Electoral Commission (EC) to enforce rules and decision, can 
always lead to suspicion and non-acceptability of election results by opposition parties and the general public. In 
this circumstance, parties and groups who feel defrauded by the electoral process will resort to non-democratic 
forms of protests, riot and violence.  
The nexus between electoral fraud and violence can present a situation where voter confidence in the 
electoral process is eroded which can trigger violence after the declaration of the election results. Fraud-induced 
violence can occur at every phase of the electoral cycle. Crucial to the concept of electoral violence is the 
avoidable electoral administrative errors committed by unprofessional electoral bodies.  Electoral violence takes 
place in a context of uncertainty, fear and mistrust. In such an environment administrative errors are likely to 
trigger violence if a contesting party perceives that the electoral body is skewing the electoral process to favour a 
rival candidate. Pastor (1999: 1) succinctly state that “many elections fail because one party interprets a 
‘technical irregularity’ as politically-inspired by its opponents, whereas it might be due to administrative 
failures”. For example, the results of the 2012 elections Ghana were challenged by the New Patriotic Party 
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(NPP), the then opposition party on grounds of voting fraud and administrative errors on the part of the Electoral 
Commission of Ghana. It is thus of vital importance that the EMB can reassure the population in general and the 
contesting parties that an administrative error on the part of the electoral body was unintended and an exception, 
rather than the rule. There are a number of guiding principles for EMBs to gain this public confidence. 
According Pastor (1999) an EMB that is independent, impartial, authoritative, and competent, and perceived as 
such, with adequate resources and capacity , has a far greater likelihood of conducting an election that is judged 
fair and free by all parties in a country and by the international community than one that does not have these 
attributes. 
According to (IFES, 2014), newly established electoral bodies may suffer from lack of knowledge and 
experience, which may be confused with corruption or malpractice. These EMBs require enough time for 
effective election management to prevent fraud at every stage of the electoral process. It is established that, in 
post-conflict elections, the influence of electoral institutions and the design of the electoral system play an 
important role in encouraging peace building and reducing the chances of electoral violence (Sisk, 2008). This 
calls on professional electoral body to put a framework in place to mitigate emerging and potential electoral 
threats that could degenerate into electoral violence. Table 1 shows electoral threats at the various phases of the 
electoral process:  
Table 1. Phases of Electoral Threat 
 
Election Phase                    Threats and Tactics 
 
 
Phase I: The Long  
Run- Up to  
Electoral Events: 18 months to 3 
months before Election Day 
Intimidation or removal of independent judges Intimidation or targeting of 
election officials  
Intimidation or harassment of journalists 
Incitement to violence in the media or public venue 
Police or internal intelligence ser vices targeting of meetings of opposition 
figures 
Protecting, expanding, or delineating turf or ‘no-go zones’ Increased rates of 
hostage-taking, kidnapping, and extortion 
Phase II: The 
Campaign’s Final Lap 
Clashes between rival groups of supporters Attacks on election rallies or 
candidates Bomb scares 
Attacks or intimidation of election officials 
Attacks on observers, domestic and international 
Phase III: Polling Day Attacks by armed rebel groups to disrupt the polling, to limit turnout, or to 
attack security forces on police stations 
Intimidation of voters to compel them to vote or stay away 
Attacks on election administrators or observers 
Physical attacks on election materials such as destruction of ballot boxes 
Phase IV: Between 
Voting and Proclamation 
Armed clashes among political par ties 
Violent clashes among groups of rival supporters Vandalism and physical 
attacks on proper ty of opponents targeted attacks against specific candidates 
or political par ties 
Phase V: Post-Election 
Outcomes and 
Their Aftermath 
Attacks on rivals who have either won in elections, or were defeated 
Violent street protests and efforts by armed riot police to maintain or restore 
order, tear gas, firing on protestors, attacks by protestors on proper ty or the 
police 
Emergence of armed resistance groups against an elected government 
 
Escalation and perpetuation of ethnic or sectarian violence.  
Source: United States Agency for International Development (2010) 
Some African states demanded an impartial body to run elections at the time of adopting their national 
constitutions. Various legal jurisprudence has also demanded impartiality from election management bodies. For 
instance, in the case of the Republican Party v. Malawi Electoral Commission and Others (Constitutional Case 
No. 5, 2004),  the Malawian Constitutional Court argued that an election management body must be in fact 
proactive and independent in the discharge of its functions and that any traits short of this would present 
difficulty in the acceptability of election results. To this end, attempts have been made by some African countries 
to restore confidence in the composition of the membership of their election management bodies. For example, 
in Zimbabwe, to miminise the president’s influence over the appointment of the Chairperson of the Electoral 
Commission, the laws now require the president to do so in consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. 
In 2008, the Constitution of Kenya was also amended to pave way for the members of Independent Electoral and 
Boundary Commission (IEBC) to be appointed jointly by the president and the official leader of Opposition 
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(Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 2008). The independence of the EMB is measured not only in terms of the 
appointment of its members, but also according to each member’s credibility and past record (Aaken, 2007). The 
individual member of the election bodies must not only be neutral, but also be seen to be impartial in the 
discharge of their duties. Prior to the 2008 Zimbabwe election, various stakeholders and opposition parties 
expressed doubts as to the ability of the Electoral Commission of Zimbabwe to be impartial, due to the close 
association between its members and president Robert Mugabi. Similar doubts were expressed prior to 2007 
Kenya election, where the vice-chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission, Kihara 
Muttu, had previously acted as the personal Lawyer for the then incumbent President, Moi Kibaki. 
To prevent electoral violence in Africa, the core assignment of the election management bodies is to 
conduct elections with integrity, credibility and free and fair in order to guarantee the acceptability of the 
election results to prevent the electoral body from accusation of fraud. When designing the criteria for 
membership of the electoral bodies, it is recommended to adopt independent model to avoid mistrust and 
suspicions from contesting parties that can degenerate into electoral violence. Election management bodies must 
commit to the principles of independence and impartiality in order to achieve the buy-in by candidates and the 
general public. This would enable these EMBs to conduct elections that comply with laws to avoid interference 
of state actor in the discharge of their functions. In order to professionalise itself, the commission should 
undertake intensive capacity building trainings to minimise the number of disputes that would arise as a result of 
the electoral administration. 
 
3. Electoral Dispute Resolution 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights adopted in (1966) both recognise that the legitimacy and the basis of authority of government must be 
expressed by the will of the people through free and fair elections. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1981) affirms these Treaties by stating that every citizen has the right to participate freely in the 
government of his or her country whether directly or through democratically elected representatives. This makes 
elections an essential component to institutionalise legitimate power. However, the management and 
organization of elections in some African countries that should respect universal suffrage as a basic human right 
have often degenerated into a full-blown conflict. Election-related conflict is one of the major threats to 
democracy and political stability in Africa. The credibility of elections and stability of the election environment 
hinge on the capacity of the State to effectively resolve these disputes throughout the electoral cycle. 
Whiles most international and domestic standards for assessing credibility of election have focused on the 
electoral process, not much attention has been given to electoral dispute resolution as a mechanism for reducing 
conflict in Africa. The stability of electoral processes largely depends on the way in which electoral tensions are 
managed. Crouzel (2014) posits that responses towards the management of electoral dispute in Africa have 
generally been of a reactive nature, responding to the crisis rather than prioritising the prevention of the violence. 
According to Sweeney (2016), mechanisms for election dispute resolution (EDR) must withstand the test of 
political manipulation or attempts by autocratic leaders in Africa to use the judicial system to legitimize staying 
in power. The EDR mechanism should therefore serve as an effective remedy to address electoral manipulation, 
impunity for violence, intimidation and harassment associated with electoral contest. A refusal by opposition 
parties or losing candidates to accept electoral outcomes can undermine the authority of the government, weaken 
trust in democracy and democratic institutions, and in extreme cases trigger violence. Electoral losers play a 
crucial role in the functioning and development of democratic political institutions and that their perceptions of 
the system’s legitimacy have potentially critical effects on that system’s proper functioning and maintenance 
(Mendes et al., 2009).  
Election disputes are inherent to elections. Therefore, challenging the conduct of an election or its results, 
should however not be perceived as a reflection of weakness in the electoral system, but as proof of the strength, 
vitality, and openness of the political system. This underscores the capacity of the state to deal with electoral 
conflict. Studies into the acceptance of election results suggests that both the rules governing an electoral process 
(Przeworski, 1991) and the experience of the institutions and individuals administering those rules (Atkeson and 
Saunders, 2003) are important to public perceptions of an electoral process and outcome. Przeworski contends 
that democracy is a system of ruled “organized uncertainty” whereby electoral outcomes must be uncertain to 
ensure participation in competition, but the system or process for political competition must be governed by rules. 
In recent years, randomised control trials have been used to test the link between procedural justice, public 
perceptions, and public behavior. In summarizing the results of these trials, academic Kristina Murphy observed: 
“researchers have typically found that members of the public who have interactions with procedurally just 
authorities are significantly more likely to evaluate those authorities positively and are more willing to display 
cooperative and compliant behaviours.” (Kristina, 2017, pp.43). In electoral practice, a complaint or petition, 
generally, may refer to the original submission of an application for relief from a violation of electoral law, 
regulations or procedures. These complaints may be filed at any level of electoral cycle to the body directly 
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responsible for taking a required action.  
Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms vary greatly country-by-country, based largely on historical and 
political context. Identifying obligations for EDR, based on public international law has proven difficult because 
international obligations related to dispute resolution have not necessarily been tied explicitly to the electoral 
process.  Public international law appears only to provide the highest-level guidance regarding the resolution of 
disputes. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966) and regional treaties such as 
African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa stipulate a number of 
obligations upon States Parties which provide a broad framework for the resolution of disputes. These 
international treaties on democracy require that persons whose civil or political rights have been violated are 
entitled effective remedy. In its General Comment No. 31, the UNHRC interpreted this article to require states to 
make available judicial and administrative and other means to remedy violations. According to the UNHRC, 
states must respond to violations even if they are committed by other branches or levels of government, or by 
third parties. According to United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Report on Electoral 
Security Framework (2010), institutions charged with the responsibility of resolving electoral disputes must be 
impartial and equipped to fairly and transparently adjudicate disputes so that the grievances do not turn violent.  
The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network classifies election dispute systems as conducted by the judiciary, EMBs, 
or specially appointed election tribunals, among other bodies. Table 2 shows a global survey of such models. 
Table 2. Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
Institution          Number of Countries      % of Countries 
Judiciary  103 51.7% 
EMB 89 44.7% 
Specially Electoral Tribunal 30 15.0% 
Other 24 12.0% 
No Information available 5 2.5% 
Not Applicable 1 0.5% 
Source: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network 
In some post-conflict countries, the international community has established an adhoc election dispute 
resolution mechanisms to oversee and adjudicate on electoral complaints. Examples include Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1996), the Electoral Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) in Kosovo (2000) and the Electoral 
Complaints Commission (ECC) in Afghanistan (2005– 2009).  The setup of these conflict resolution bodies 
managed to reduce tension and acrimony that greeted elections in those countries (IFES, 2010). For the first time 
in the history of Afghanistan, the Electoral Complaints Commission played a pivotal role in investigating and 
adjudicating fraud, sending the 2019 election to second round. Despite these gains in other environment, in 
Africa, the compliance level to international standards and treaties governing democratic elections have not been 
encouraging. Electoral Dispute Resolution mechanisms have not received the same amount of analysis and 
attention that other aspects of the electoral process, such as voter registration, have.   
While some scholars and practitioners have focused on a broad array of issues related to election disputes, 
this study focuses on a narrower set of issues related to the interaction between the electoral process and judicial 
system mediated principally by the right to a fair and impartial hearing and those that are related to the provision 
of an effective remedy to prevent violence. In the context of the electoral process, EDR involves the system of 
judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms through which electoral actions can be legally challenged and electoral 
rights protected. In the context of the judicial system, EDR is defined as any form of remedial actions through 
which the State provides redress for violations of Covenant rights. This article seeks to explore the model and 
structure of electoral dispute resolution in Africa from the regulatory framework and electoral governance 
institution approach. Whiles the legislative and regulatory approach adopts adjudicatory model for election 
dispute resolution, the electoral governance approach adopts a preventive model using matrix of inclusion. 
 
3.1 Legislative and Regulatory Approach 
This is where the necessary constitutional, legislative and regulatory framework have been put in place by a 
country to deal with the management of election related conflicts. This include the establishment of election 
tribunals or electoral courts for resolving election disputes in Africa. Article 14 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
guarantee the right to due process. That is, all people are equally entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. This right to due process is well recognized in 
traditional court systems, but is an equally essential right in the adjudication of electoral disputes. According to 
the International Center for Transitional Justice, widespread violations of human rights call for transitional 
justice responses.  All States must take necessary steps to ensure the realisation of human rights (ICCPR, 1966). 
This obligation requires states to take legislative and other measures to ensure that human rights are fulfilled and 
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protected. Effective EDR mechanisms, through which fundamental rights and freedoms are protected, are 
essential components to determining whether the election can truly be considered genuine and a reflection of the 
will of the people (AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, 2002). 
Studies of the 2000 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore suggest that in gaining acceptance of a 
controversial decision, the Court benefitted from the widespread view of the Court as a legitimate institution 
(Gibson et al., 2003). In contrast, Carter Center observers report on the 2011 presidential elections in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suggested that citizens’ belief in the inadequacy of the DRC’s dispute 
resolution mechanism may have contributed to widespread protest and violence during the electoral cycle as 
citizens resorted to protest, frustrated that there were no other avenues to express their grievances (Carter Center 
Final Report, 2011). This points to the fact that the underdeveloped system in some political environment do not 
sufficiently protect citizens’ fundamental right to adjudicative remedy for alleged violations of their rights. To 
this end, strengthening EDR processes in ways that are visible to the public prior to an election can be essential 
to public confidence. 
Elections in Africa are always fiercely contested. As a result, most African countries anticipated the 
possibility of electoral dispute among stakeholders and have instituted constitutional and statutory framework to 
handle such disputes. Section 285(1-3) of The Nigerian Constitution of 1999, for example, provides for election 
tribunals to handle post-elections petitions. Section 285 (1) states that: ‘There shall be established for the 
federation one or more election tribunals to be known as the National Assembly Election Tribunals which shall, 
to the exclusion of any court or tribunal, have original jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions”. Similar 
provisions are contained in the constitutions of most African countries under the new era of electoral democracy.  
 In respect of Complaint Procedures and Judicial Review in Post conflict Liberia, the Liberian Constitution, 
Article 83 (c) reads that “Any party or candidate who complains about the manner in which the elections were 
conducted or who challenges the results thereof shall have the right to file a complaint with the Elections 
Commission. Such complaint must be filed not later than seven days after the announcement of the results of the 
elections.” In the Southern African region (SADC), courts are legally empowered to mediate in pre-election, 
election and post-election disputes. In Botswana, for example, section 132 of the Electoral Act provide that 
election petitions be heard by the High Court, in which case petitions must be submitted within 30 days of the 
announcement of the result that is disputed. In Angola, complaints during registration of voters can be presented 
to the provincial courts. During the voting process and in the post-electoral phase, complaints are filed with the 
Supreme Court. Candidates and their mandatories are in a position to filed such complaints (Fandrych, 2003).  
However, in some jurisdictions, the consideration given EDR is shared by different state institutions. For 
example, in Kenya, jurisdiction over various types of electoral disputes and violations resides with both the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and Political Parties Disputes Tribunal (PPDT), 
while jurisdiction for electoral offenses is with the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), and 
jurisdiction for post-election petitions the judiciary (High Courts, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court). Despite 
this shared jurisdiction, each body has responsibility to provide due process protections when resolving 
complaints and disputes of all types. According Icelandic Human Rights Centre (2017), procedural justice 
encapsulates the right to be treated fairly, and to receive an effective remedy, through an efficient and transparent 
administration of justice. This involves both the protection of due process and the advancement of open justice. 
If the courts are legitimate venues for justice, then judicial remedies can be employed to rectify the impact of 
violence on an election. The question is whether the judicial system in most African states are independent to 
administer justice in the midst of heated electoral contest where the stakes are high. Whiles the judicial system in 
some African countries demonstrated the willingness to apply the law with fear or favour, others have failed to 
deliver electoral justice. Countries like Ghana and South Africa are prominent examples judicial assertiveness 
and independence.  
On the contrary, the constitutional court of Cote D’Ivoire failed to administer after 2007 elections by 
invalidating the election results declared by the Electoral Commission in favour of the then incumbent president, 
Laurent Gbagbo. This decision of the court resulted to post electoral civil unrest. In recent times, however, the 
judicial system in some electorally conflict prone countries on the African continent have also demonstrated 
readiness to exact justice on election related disputes. For example, in Nigeria, the ordinary courts over turned an 
election that was deemed to be too violent and fraudulent. The Court of Appeals in Ibadan, Nigeria, nullified the 
results of a senatorial election because it was marred by violence, thuggery, and intimidation (Ajayi, 2009).  
Domestic courts also play a role in redressing the grievances of the victims of electoral violence. This redress 
does not only include the prosecution of the perpetrators, but also the consideration of reparations for untimely 
death, disabling injury or property destruction (Hansen, 2009). 
The jurisprudence that emphasizes the importance of courts and tribunals to conduct their public duty to 
safeguard against judicial bias, unfairness and incompetence, is articulated in Article 14(1) of the ICCPR (1966) 
and the UNHRC General Comment 32 (2000). This principle of justice is encapsulated in the quote of Lord 
Hewart of the United Kingdom House of Lords, now the Supreme Court of United Kingdom that “justice should 
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not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” (Spigelman, 2000). According to 
this principle, any institution dealing with the adjudication and resolution of election disputes must operate with 
a high degree of transparency, independence and accountability. This means that for the adjudicatory approach to 
election dispute resolution to realise its potential of dealing with electon dispute and conflict, it must involve 
procedural justice, due process and open justice. Figure 1 shows the study’s model of election dispute resolution 
mechanism using the adjudicatory approach. 
  
Figure 1. Dispute Resolution Approach 
Studies by Tyler (1988) on citizen interaction with legal authorities revealed seven underlying dimensions 
to perceptions of judicial fairness: opportunity for representation, quality of decision, honesty, ethicality and 
motivation of the authorities, lack of bias of authorities, and opportunities for correction. The constitutional 
provisions of most African countries have not been applied to Tyler’s standard to help deal exhaustively with the 
challenges of post-election conflict resolution on the continent. The delay of justice for election petitions serve to 
undermine the search for electoral justice. According to Omotola (2009), in Nigeria, till date, some election 
petitions filed following the disputed general election in 2007 are still ongoing.  However, in countries like 
Ghana and South Africa, the courts have been helpful to curb election disputes degenerating in violence by 
speedily and professionally disposal of election petitions and complaints. This exemplary conduct of the judicial 
activism was witnessed in Kenya, where the Supreme Court of Kenya tactfully and professionally handled the 
election petition filed by the opposition candidate, Raila Amolo Odinga following the disputed 2017 presidential 
elections.  
This is corroborated by a study conducted by Frempong (2010). According to Frempong, the role of the 
judiciary has been most beneficial in resolving election disputes. The judiciary in Ghana has asserted its 
independence and has treated most election-related petitions with alacrity. Such cases included: the fixing of the 
7th December Election Day, the controversy over the use of thumb-printed voter identification cards in 2000, 
and the creation and demarcation of constituency boundaries. Notable of such judicial response is the tact and 
professional manner in which the Supreme Court of Ghana handled the 2012 election petition filed by the then 
opposition, the New Patriotic Party following the disputed election results in the 2012 presidential elections.  
This underscores the need for the elements of procedural justice, open justice and due process to be present in 
the overall electoral legal architecture. The impartial and fair application of this triangular constitutional, 
legislative and regulatory approach by the judiciary towards resolution of election related dispute could have the 
impact of minimising post electoral conflict.  
 
3.2 Electoral Governance Approach  
Election Management Bodies (EMBs) are responsible of the administration of the election. Additional duties 
may also be bestowed on these bodies to act as arbiter of election disputes. The role of the EMBs as arbiters 
towards dispute resolution could be adjudicatory where it acts as a judicial body or conflict preventive through 
effective stakeholder management, consensus building and electoral reform programmes where the EMB acts in 
the capacity as an administrator of elections. But in both instances, the EMB must be neutrally professional and 
independent. Public confidence in the election dispute resolution process is two-fold. It requires trust in the 
independence and impartiality of arbiters who decide cases, as well as trust in the process through which the 
decisions are made (Gibson et al., 2003). This segment of the article deals with how election management bodies 
in Africa could adopt and apply administrative procedures to prevent and manage electoral disputes from filing 
to disposition. However, some election management institutions acting quasi-judicial capacity are often 
unprepared to apply the legal standards necessary to protect procedural justice in competitive electoral 
environment (IFES, 2016). This could be that these institutions do not have the judicial infrastructure in place to 
implement procedure in a manner that protects procedural justice rights of aggrieved stakeholders in election 
management.  
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Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 10 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) guarantee the right to due process.  This right to due process is 
well recognized in traditional court systems, but is an equally essential right in the adjudication of electoral 
disputes. It must be respected regardless of whether an election complaint or irregularity is dealt with 
administratively.  This highlights the fact that the competence of the EMB to consider disputes will be 
determined by the nature of the dispute itself, and a distinction must be made between what are essentially 
administrative issues, and issues that impact fundamental rights. Issues of administrative nature in election 
administration may well be handled by an EMB or other administrative body may be sufficient. However, if 
rights are violated, then, the state is obligated to investigate and, if a violation is determined, provide a remedy. 
The issue of whether an electoral contestant appears on the ballot, for example can illustrate this. Being denied 
access to a ballot is a fundamental human rights issue, but if you are on the ballot, the sequence of the 
contestant’s position on the ballot is an administrative issue that must be handled by the EMB through a 
transparent process. 
Some countries in Africa have either a permanent or mixed model for election dispute resolution. In South 
Africa, the Electoral Commission Act (No 51 of 1996) empowers the electoral commission to adjudicate 
disputes that may arise from the organisation, administration and conduct of elections, provided such disputes 
are primarily of an administrative nature. In the discharge of this dispute resolution function, the Electoral 
Commission act as a tribunal and its decisions are subject to review by the Electoral Court. Again, in Kenya, the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) is responsible for resolving electoral disputes, except 
election petitions and disputes subsequent to the declaration of election results (IEBC Act, 2016). However, the 
Political Parties Disputes Tribunal (PPDT) in Kenya, has jurisdiction over disputes between political parties, 
party members, candidates, and coalitions, as well as appellate jurisdiction regarding the decisions of the 
Registrar of Political Parties and disputes arising out of party primaries (Political Parties (Amendment)(No.2) 
Act, 2016. This requires electoral governance institution to be professional, independent to implement effective 
dispute resolution system for correct interpretation and application of electoral laws and procedures. In the 
absence of this, electoral dispute resolution may be nothing more than mere facade, with limited or no actual 
effect in conflict resolution. 
A more fundamental issue relates to the question of professional and impartial application of dispute 
resolution laws by the EMBs. It is unclear whether the EMBs would be considered independent given that they 
are also a stakeholder to administer the elections.  According to Shola (2015), while laws are important to shape 
and reshape electoral contests and provide the basis for litigation in the event of violations, no law can, on its 
own, guarantee fair play in the conduct of elections.  UNHRC General Comment 32 (2000: p.33) states that “an 
EMB that administers an election and then adjudicates disputes related to the administration of that election may 
not appear impartial to a reasonable observer”. This means that much depends on the capacity, neutrality and 
professionalism on the election management body to conduct the elections in accordance with international 
standards of democratic elections and established domestic laws and regulations. It is therefore, important to 
underscore that, application of the legislative approach to election dispute resolution may not necessarily 
guarantee credible and incident free elections. For example, the Ghana Electoral Commission which is globally 
noted to conduct credible competitive elections has no legal mandate to adjudicate on election related dispute. 
The Commission has since 1993, adopted an administrative machinery using the electoral cycle and stakeholder 
management approach to mitigate or prevent electoral dispute through the institution of the Inter-party Advisory 
Committee (IPAC).  
The IPAC, is platform created by the Electoral Commission of Ghana to brings together political parties and 
other critical stakeholders to dialogue on critical matters that affect election administration with the aim of 
deepening the electoral system of Ghana. The platform improves cooperation between the commission and 
registered parties on all electoral matters. This seeks to handle disputes that may threaten the conduct of 
elections in Ghana. This election dispute resolution mechanism has also been adopted in some African countries. 
For example, the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa established the Party Liaison Committee as 
an important political co-operation mechanism which has contributed substantially to the prevention of electoral 
violence. This electoral governance approach to preventing and managing electoral dispute should permeate 
through the electoral cycle and must involve the use of matrix of inclusion through stakeholder management. 
 
3.3 Electoral Cycle Approach  
Elections are very complex, dynamic and involve high-stake processes. As a result, election administration is not 
an event but a process that requires continuous perfection and improvement. Studies show that a comprehensive 
program to support democratisation and good governance through elections and to reduce tensions around 
election time should focus on long run and not on short term interventions (Fischer, 2002; Höglund, 2006; 2009). 
An electoral cycle is a visual planning and training tool that aims to support electoral actors to acknowledge the 
cyclical nature and the various challenges faced in electoral processes (IDEA, 2006). The electoral cycle 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) DOI: 10.7176/PPAR 
Vol.9, No.7, 2019 
 
11 
appreciates elections as continuous processes rather than isolated events (ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 
2011). According to Brancati and Snyder (2010), decsions by electoral institutions of what could be done in 
order to guarantee free and fair elections and to minimise conflict has to include the entire electoral cycle. This 
means that effective and transparent involvement of stakeholders in the implementation of electoral cycle helps 
to mitigate disputes and conflicts. To this end, to avoid suspicion and mistrust, election management bodies must 
involve stakeholders in all phases of the electoral project. Figure 2 demonstrates the electoral cycle approach to 
election dispute resolution. 
 
Figure 2. The Electoral Cycle Approach 
Fischer (2002) distinguishes five different types of electoral related violence: (1)Identity conflict during the 
registration process when citizens cannot establish or re-establish their official recognition as voters, (2) 
Campaign conflicts as rivals seek to disrupt the opponents’ campaigns, intimidate voters and candidates, and use 
threats and violence to influence participation in the voting, (3) Balloting conflict on election day when rivalries 
are played out at the polling station, (4) Disputes over election results and the inability of judicial mechanisms to 
resolve disputes a fair, timely, and transparent manner, and (5) Representation when elections are organized as 
‘zero sum’ events and ‘losers’ are left out of participation in governance. This requires electoral governance 
institutions to put in place mechanisms to resolve electoral disputes throughout the entire electoral cycle. These 
mechanisms should provide possibilities to handle election related complaints and disputes at any phase of the 
electoral process in an efficient and independent way, since compared to the legislative approach, delay in the 
procedures can affect the resolution process 
 
5. Stakeholder Management Approach 
The stakeholders of an election management body are individuals, groups and organizations that have an interest 
in the electoral process. These stakeholders are directly affected by the activities, policies and practices of the 
EMB. Stakeholder engagement process is an integral part of sustainable election governance (Akwei, 2018). 
Most studies on electoral violence tend to focus on during election and post-election activities. Yet political 
parties, contesting candidates, security forces, civil society and the media remain key stakeholders in the 
electoral process. The actions of these groups play persuasive role on the minds of the electorate. Political parties 
and the followers for instance, can destruct the electoral process in the run-up to the elections, during the 
elections and after the elections. Stakeholder management is therefore a critical tool to build confidence in the 
election management bodies.  
Voter and public confidence in elections has an effect on the legitimacy of institutions and the quality of 
democratic representation. Research indicates that confidence in governing institutions, especially procedural 
fairness, promotes regime support and compliance of public policies (Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Tyler 2001). 
Thus, such perceptions of the election process are critical for the maintenance of peace and order in a democratic 
state. Other studies have suggested that confidence in election administrators is related to confidence in election 
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outcomes (Barrientos del Monte (2008). According to Krevel (2009), the attitude of election management bodies 
(EMBs) towards critical stakeholders in the electoral process helps influence individual perceptions of election 
quality and political participation thereby reducing tension in electoral contest. In pursuit of this assertion, the 
role to be ascribed to civil society, political parties and the media in support of Electoral Management Bodies in 
preventing electoral dispute remains unquestionable. This segment of the article seeks to assess stakeholder 
engagement framework for electoral governance institutions in Africa as a dispute resolution mechanism to 
create, communicate, deliver, and exchange sustainable strategies to mitigate election violence. Figure 3 shows 
some critical election stakeholders. 
 
Figure 3. Electoral Stakeholders Matrix 
A study by the United States Institute of Peace assessed the efficacy of different prevention strategies to 
reduce electoral violence. The study proved that prevention strategies do work in reducing violence. A particular 
measurable indicator of the study suggests that civil society programs seem to be limited in their efficacy despite 
its theoretically compelling logic as an effective conflict prevention tool (Claes, 2016). Claes suggests that state-
led programs in the form of security enhancement and improving election administration and management offer 
the most effective means to reduce electoral violence. In contrast, Höglund and Jarstad (2010) argue that civil 
society organizations (CSOs) can initiate successful programmes to limit election violence. According to the 
researchers, civil society’s adoption of acceptable codes of conduct during elections can help bring together 
contesting candidates to support peaceful election. Adebayo (2016) argues that training and agreement among 
media organizations for journalists on best practices for ‘conflict-sensitive reporting’ can help reduce election 
violence.  The integration of civil society and the media to participate in the electoral process by way of 
monitoring and reporting of election day activities, including documenting acts of election day violence and 
intimidation can reduce electoral tension and violence. According to Oduro (2012), the involvement of Coalition 
of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) in the Ghanaian electoral process has shown to be a successful 
example of CSO-generated initiative to combat electoral violence. 
Studies suggest that several types of stakeholder typological strategies for preventing electoral violence 
have the potential to successfully reduce the risks of violence (Claes, 2016). The prevalence of electoral violence 
on the African continent suggest that some stakeholder initiatives have proved not to be workable in all countries. 
It should be noted that no single set of programme exists that will prove effective across all countries. Different 
historical, institutional and enthno-political environment require that strategies be tailored to meet the needs of 
particular countries circumstances. Table 3 proposes a typology of electoral violence prevention strategies 
encountered both in literature and field research.    
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Table 3. Typology of programs for the prevention of electoral violence 
 Civil society-initiated programs Government-initiated programs 
 
 
 
Election 
technical 
assistance 
Shorter term: 
Independent domestic 
election monitors 
(NEWS, Sierra Leone; 
CODEO, Ghana). 
 
Early warning system 
and mapping of hotspot 
areas (WANEP, Sierra 
Leone; CMEV, Sri 
Lanka). 
Longer term: 
Journalist/media 
training on election 
violence-sensitive 
reporting (AFSC, 
Kenya & 
Sierra Leone). 
Shorter term: 
Inviting 
international 
election monitors 
(UN, EU, Carter 
Center, etc.). 
 
Civic education of 
rules and processes 
for casting ballots 
and running for 
office. 
Longer term: 
Strengthening 
election 
management body. 
 
Constitutional 
change/reform of 
electoral laws 
(Kenya 2010). 
 
Post-election dispute 
resolution 
mechanisms 
 
 
 
Social peace 
building 
Shorter term: 
Peace messaging 
during campaign 
(ActionAid, Sierra 
Leone & Nigeria; 
NICE, Malawi). 
 
Civic education of 
rights, laws, and 
regulations regarding 
election (SEAG, Sierra 
Leone; NICE &MESN 
Malawi) 
Longer term: 
Youth peace 
programming and 
education (PAMBIO, 
Kenya; Amani clubs, 
Kenya). 
 
Fostering 
intercommunity 
dialogue (PeaceNet, 
Kenya) 
 
Sensitization of 
gendered nature of 
electoral violence 
(VAWIE). 
Shorter term: 
Training and 
stationing of law 
enforcement for 
election security 
(UNDP, Kenya, 
Malawi, Sierra 
Leone). 
 
Establishing peace 
platforms and local 
peace committees 
for the election 
(MPLC, Malawi; 
Uwiano, Kenya 
Longer term: 
Broad ethnic 
integration and 
promotion of 
tolerance (NCIC & 
NSC, Kenya). 
 
Land/resource 
conflict resolution 
(NLC, Kenya). 
 
Political party 
engagement 
Shorter term: 
Authoring peace 
pledges for parties and 
candidates to sign 
(PAC, Malawi). 
 
Provide support and 
resources for female 
candidates (WSR, 
Sierra 
Leone). 
 
Involve political 
candidates 
and parties in field 
programs 
Longer term: 
Training for political 
parties 
on manifesto 
development 
and issue-based 
campaigning 
(CMD-Kenya). 
 
Recruit youth party 
wing 
members in peace 
programs (ActionAid, 
Sierra Leone). 
Shorter term: 
Establish 
enforceable 
““code of conduct” 
for 
parties (PPRC, 
Sierra 
Leone; MEC, 
Malawi). 
 
Encourage parties’ 
participation in 
peace 
platforms and local 
committees 
(MPLC, Malawi; 
Uwiano, Kenya). 
Longer term: 
Hate speech 
monitoring, 
enforcement of hate 
speech 
laws, and public 
sensitization 
of acceptable 
political 
discourse (NCIC, 
Kenya). 
The typology suggests that electoral violence prevention strategies can be categorized into three dimensions:  
1. The first typology deals with whether the program is civil society-initiated or government-initiated; 
2. The second typology is evaluating whether the program is aimed at improving technical and operational 
aspects of the election, aimed at promoting peace, or aimed at engaging political parties and their 
candidates; and 
3.  The third typology focus on assessing whether a program should be short term and focus on the 
elections or it should be long-term to last across multiple electoral cycles.  
The first dimension is focused on which stakeholder initiates a particular program with the tag between 
whether civil society or the government initiates violence prevention programmes. Both civil society and 
government are critical stakeholders of an electoral process. Studies on mediation systems tend to involve 
various types of stakeholders in an inclusive approach (Akwei, 2008). It is therefore essential to ensure that an 
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inclusive approach prevails within mediation systems. According to Taylor (2018), government sponsored peace 
platforms and local peace committees have the potential to effectively coordinate CSO programs at the local 
level to avoid program redundancies.  This is because CSOs are particularly active in setting up warning 
mechanisms for elections (Crouzel, 2014). While the CSOs may be constrained by resources to discharge their 
duties effectively, the state may support them in that regard.  
As a result, some conflict prevention initiatives instituted by some African countries have increased the call 
for extensive stakeholder engagement approach to preventing or mitigating electoral dispute. For example, the 
Multiparty Liaison Committees in Malawi, although state-sponsored, have proven to be an effective platform to 
encourage collaboration between incumbent and opposition parties as well as CSOs (Mapuva, 2013). In the 
South African case, the Party Liaison Committees established by the Independent Electoral Commission, 
underlines the importance of including political parties in the management of electoral conflicts. Kenya, in 2017, 
initiated several peace building programs focusing on electoral violence prevention after various calls on both 
civil society organizations and state agencies to integrate effort to promote peaceful elections. The establishment 
of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and the Multi-Sectoral Forum (MSF) to 
encourage, civil society, political parties and interreligious cooperation and dialogue to ensure peaceful election 
environment has yielded fruits. Sierra Leone’s violence prevention efforts in 2008 in the form of the National 
Early Warning System (NEWS) programme has also incorporated several organizations in implementing 
violence prevention programs.  The Amatora mu mahoro project (‘Elections in peace’) in Burundi is another 
example of a multi-stakeholder real-time mapping initiative that charts the electoral climate in a given territory. 
It is based on a rigorous methodology that reports verified occurrences of peace activities and incidents of 
election violence gathered by over 450 monitors across Burundi, thus offering comprehensive and reliable data 
for violence mitigation efforts. The pioneering example of Ghana’s Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) has 
been centripetal for stable electoral environment for the country since 1994. 
Studies demonstrates that violence can be caused by both weak election management institutions (Eklit and 
Reynold, 2002) and local resource conflicts between rival groups (Taylor, 2018). This emphasises the 
importance of the second typological dimension of violence prevention focused on interventions geared towards 
building technical competences for the election administrators to organise credible and transparent elections, 
building capacities for the communities that may be affected by election violence, or the political parties and 
candidates to prevent potential misunderstanding of the electoral process that can generate electoral conflict. 
Birch and Muchlinski (2017) refer to this violence prevention programme as capacity building strategies and 
attitude transforming strategies. This strategy tends to strengthen those institutions that manage elections, such as 
the electoral commission and election observation teams, and those strategies that attempt to inhibit violence 
through grassroots stakeholder mediation, intercommunity dialogue, and engagement with potential perpetrators 
and victims of violence. This strategy offers strong justifications for use in volatile electoral environment. For 
example, a civic education program may be used to both communicate the procedures and rules for voting and 
engage in peace messaging and stakeholder meetings in communities that are prone to violence. 
The third typology considers strategies that engage stakeholders of the electoral process for long term. This 
calls for building effective long-term alliance and collaboration between election management bodies, civil 
society and political parties. Studies show that facilitating long-term inter-community dialogue may be better put 
in the hands of civil society actors that do not face accusations of being affiliated with any political party (Akwei, 
2018; Mapuva, 2013; Taylor, 2018). This is where there seem to be differences between the Malawian 
Multiparty Liaison Committees and the Kenyan National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) and the 
Multi-Sectoral Forum (MSF). Although, there are some similarities in the two models of conflict prevention 
programmes, there exist critical differences in the design of the programmes. This difference should serve as a 
useful lesson for other countries on the continent.  
In particular, the success of Malawi’s violence prevention programs in incorporating the political candidates 
as active stakeholders serves as a key difference of practical importance. Whereas politicians were mainly side-
stepped in Kenya’s violence prevention programs, multiple programs in Malawi made considerable efforts to 
ensure that both national and local political candidates were incorporated into pre-election peace programs and 
subsequent mediation efforts. The time allocated by state actors in implementing the third strategy is of 
particular importance. According to Taylor (2018), while certain activities in the electoral cycle such as civic 
education campaigns, training of election monitors on campaign rules require shorter time frames close to the 
date of the election, other programs must permeate through the entire election cycle to be successful. This means 
that lack of sustainable funding to conflict prevention initiatives may render the programmes ineffective and 
abortive.  
Beyond these three identifiable typologies, it is essential to also involve the legitimate authorities within a 
given society. In most countries, religious and traditional actors who are listened to and respected within their 
communities are often solicited to prevent or appease conflicts. This model takes the shape of public awareness 
campaigns against electoral violence. In Senegal, religious leaders, opinion-makers and social figures such as 
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traditional wrestlers have been used as messengers of peace (LAREG, 2011). Mediation systems that already 
exist and are effective can also be mobilised within the electoral framework. Such was the case of the 
bashingantahe in Burundi, who are public figures endowed with moral authority and seen as ‘the wise’. They are 
the heirs to an informal system that manages local conflicts and have been involved as ‘peace agents’ at election 
times. These bashingantahe have been accredited by the Independent National Electoral Commission as election 
observers and mediators when electoral disputes occur.  
The multi stakeholder management of conflicts is fundamental to keeping electoral processes peaceful. In 
Nigeria, Liberia and Senegal, civil society election situation rooms were created to gather a broad coalition of 
CSOs during elections so they could pool resources and better co-ordinate their actions to identify, prevent and 
mitigate electoral tensions.  These election situation rooms tend to work in partnership with EMBs and relevant 
state authorities in order to mobilise the most appropriate responses (OSIWA, 2012). Procedures aimed at 
limiting and containing electoral violence can only be effective if they form part of the institutionalisation of the 
electoral system as a whole. However, no matter how essential this focus on the electoral system is, it is not 
sufficient to ensure the stability of electoral processes. The stability of the electoral process is narrowly 
conditioned by the implementation of democratic governance, which is a vehicle for multi-stakeholder 
interactions, accountable public action, and ensuring legitimacy among the electorate. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the past two decades, competitive elections have become a normative principle to legitimize political leaders 
in many African countries.  Credible elections in some countries like Ghana, Mauritius, and South Africa, have 
helped consolidate democratic institutions and enhanced prospects for greater economic and political 
development. In other countries, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, credible elections have paved way for 
national reconciliation and a return to democratic rule after decades of armed conflict and civil war.  On the 
other hand, flawed elections in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe have led to violence, loss of life, and 
destruction of property, and have seemed to erode the democratic dividends of elections. Studies show that in 
Africa, some of the conflicts and violence that occur around elections are as the result of a breakdown of the 
electoral process (Lopez-Pintor, 2000). This violence is somehow created by the actions and inactions of 
unprofessional electoral governance institution, ineffective and unfair legislative and adjudicatory system and the 
lack of effective involvement of critical stakeholders in the electoral process.  Electoral dispute resolution (EDR) 
is a critical part of the electoral process that requires greater attention among election practitioners and policy 
makers.  While there remain few international and domestic framework that shed light on EDR, the general 
obligations related to the right to an effective remedy, the right to a fair public hearing and concept of broad-
based inclusion in the electoral process remain strong basis to move the frontiers of election administration in 
Africa. This article set out to evaluate changes that could be made to strengthen electoral management and use it 
as fundamental concept to prevent electoral conflict in Africa.  
The analysis demonstrates that the institutions that are responsible for fair application of electoral laws (the 
courts) and those responsible to manage elections (EMBs) often fail to do so in manner that gains the acceptance 
of all stakeholders’ due lack of independence and neutrality. This shows that the higher the performance of 
EMBs and the Judicial bodies, the lower the rate of electoral violence and the lower the performance in terms of 
the independence and credibility of these institutions, the higher the rate of electoral violence. This discovery 
indicates that the level of independence and non-partisanship execution of electoral administration is profoundly 
connected with the nature of electoral disputes and viciousness. 
A wide range of suggestions for improvements have been made. These suggestions could be of great benefit 
to most Africa countries that are committed to entrench democracy by using elections as a central tool. The study 
proposes that an active participation and involvement of critical stakeholders such as the media, legislative 
bodies, political parties and civil society in the electoral process during an electoral cycle and conflict 
management processes should become the central agenda for African countries in mitigating conflict that 
occasionally surrounds elections. This means that an action-oriented dialogue among election stakeholders is 
critical for building an inclusive electoral management model. The study recommends that election management 
bodies on the African continent should consider establishing similar structures, which would serve as avenues of 
consensus building among EMBs, political parties and the electorate to forestall electoral disputes. The findings 
from this study should be considered as starting point lessons for practitioners and policy makers seeking to 
explore strategies to improve electoral democracy and the conduct of incident free elections. It is hoped that this 
study will contribute to further identifying and adapting the most effective programmes to reduce electoral 
violence in many developing countries. Additional study is recommended to further identify why similar conflict 
resolution programmes have varying levels of success in different electoral environments. 
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